The Philosophical Intuition and Conceptual Structure Workshop
Within analytic philosophy, there is a long tradition of appealing to intuitions about thought experiments to probe the structure of central philosophical concepts such as knowledge, free will, and truth. These thought experiments aim to clarify such concepts by testing proposed necessary and sufficient conditions against our intuitive judgments. More recently, a growing body of empirical work in cognitive science has shown that many natural and social concepts lack this classical structure, and has proposed a range of alternatives, from prototypes and exemplars to dual-character accounts. This raises a question: might philosophical concepts also have a non-classical structure?
Supported by a 2025 BBVA Foundation Leonardo Grant for Scientific Research and Cultural Creation for the project Philosophical Intuition and Non-Classical Conceptual Structure, this workshop brings together researchers from philosophy and cognitive science for six talks on related questions, including:
- Do philosophical concepts exhibit a classical or non-classical structure, and does philosophical expertise shape that structure?
- What is the relationship between philosophical intuitions and concepts?
- Do philosophers and non-philosophers share the same intuitions, or does philosophical training reshape them?
- If philosophical concepts are non-classical, what follows for the method of cases and the search for necessary and sufficient conditions?
- How can empirical methods from cognitive science help reveal the structure of philosophical concepts?
Workshop Program
The workshop will take place in the Sala de Juntas de Filosofía, at the Faculty of Psychology (Cartuja University Campus).
Thursday 26th
Dual character concepts and metalinguistic negotiations in legal philosophy
Abstract: When faced with immoral statutes, people are often drawn to statements such as: “There is one sense in which this statute is a law, but ultimately, it is no law at all”. What best explains this contradictory-sounding linguistic intuition and what are its implications for the study of legal argumentation? According to one influential theory, saying that an unjust statute is not a law reflects a proposal to change the meaning of the word “law” so that it no longer picks out grossly unjust statutes. Thus, although the statement employs descriptive language (about what the law “is” and “isn’t”), what it really expresses is a normative proposal in a negotiation about language. According to an alternative account, the acceptance of the contradictory-sounding statement tells us something important about our shared concept of law. In particular, it tells us that the concept of law has a dual character, meaning that there are two different and relatively independent criteria for something to be a law. One of the criteria is descriptive in nature, while the other is normative. Thus, whenever a statute fulfills one criterion, but not the other, we are drawn to statements that express this conflict. The present talk compares the explanatory merits of the two alternatives.
What is reasonable for artificial intelligence?
Abstract: The reasonable person standard is central to ethics and law, particularly in assessing negligence and responsibility. Previous research shows that judgments of what is reasonable typically fall between what is average and what is ideal (Bear & Knobe, 2017; Tobia, 2018; Tobia et al., 2024). We examine whether the same pattern applies to AI, particularly large language models. Given evidence on algorithm aversion and automation bias, we hypothesized that people set stricter standards for AI than for humans. Specifically, we predicted that (H1) reasonable judgments would lie between average and ideal for both agents, and (H2) AI reasonableness would be judged closer to the ideal. In a 2 (agent: AI vs. human) × 3 (average, reasonable, ideal) between-subjects experiment, participants evaluated assertion and non-assertion scenarios. Results supported the first hypothesis: reasonableness consistently fell between average and ideal, but was not significantly closer to the ideal for AI than for humans (only numerically).
How is the concept of death structured?
Abstract: Ordinary judgments about whether someone is dead may not depend on a fixed set of necessary and sufficient conditions. Across a series of studies, I test whether cases of death vary in typicality and whether judgments reflect the combined influence of consciousness, vital functioning, and bodily integration. These studies aim to clarify whether the ordinary concept of death has a graded, multidimensional structure rather than a simple rule-based one.
The afternoon will be free for conference speakers and open to discuss ongoing projects.
We will have an informal vegan dinner to wrap up the first day of the workshop.
Friday 27th
Risky choice framing effects, doing vs. allowing harm, and fairness in uncertain prospects
Abstract: In popular interpretations, risky choice framing effects are taken to reveal human irrationality. Even authors who argue that frames can sometimes highlight the reason-giving aspects of an outcome often treat the standard pattern of choices in canonical experiments, such as the Asian Disease Problem (ADP), as irrational. This paper proposes a new approach to studying risky choice framing effects, including those observed in the ADP, by interpreting them in terms of reasons: such effects occur when different frames highlight distinct reason-giving aspects of a situation and thereby shape how decision-makers represent and evaluate the available options, which in turn leads to systematic differences in choice. This reason-based approach has significant implications for debates about the apparent irrationality of choices in risky choice framing effects and about the supposed equivalence of the ADP options. It suggests that framing may influence not only how outcomes are valued, but also which considerations are taken to be relevant to the decision. Our central claim is that responsiveness to such reasons can, in some cases, be rational. To assess this proposal, we report a new experimental study examining the extent to which non-consequentialist moral reasons related to the doing/allowing distinction and fairness can explain choices in “sacrificial dilemmas” such as the ADP. Our findings suggest that participants’ choices are sensitive to these considerations, supporting the view that framing effects in moral contexts cannot be fully explained by standard outcome-based models.
Truth intuitions and the structure of truth concepts
Abstract: Truth is frequently assumed to be conceptually straightforward. However, empirical research reveals substantial variation in truth judgments across contexts, experimental tasks, and individuals. In this talk, I examine the factors that pull truth intuitions in different directions and argue that understanding the structure of our concepts of truth is essential for making progress on these questions.
Testing the prototype structure of philosophical concepts
Abstract: The method of cases assumes that philosophical intuitions track classically structured concepts –i.e., categories with necessary and sufficient conditions. Yet many everyday concepts instead show a prototype structure (e.g., Zaki et al., 2003). We ask whether this holds for core philosophical concepts, such as free will, moral responsibility, knowledge or personal identity. In a pre-registered study, we combine three methods: (1) typicality ratings, testing whether paradigmatic instances of a concept are judged more central than atypical ones; (2) reaction time, testing whether reaction times are slower for low-similarity cases, as prototype models predict; and (3) individual-level, non-nested model comparison, to classify participants’ concepts as criterion-based or similarity-based. In this talk, we will present the results and discuss their implications for the method of cases.
Conflicting intuitions
Abstract: One striking fact about philosophical questions is that they tend to be confusing. Ask a room full of people about a philosophical question, and you will not find that they all converge on the exact same answer. Instead, you will find an array of different intuitions that seem to point toward different answers. One traditional explanation of this phenomenon is that different people have different intuitions. On this traditional explanation, the phenomenon is primarily a matter of interpersonal disagreement. I will be providing evidence for a very different explanation. On this alternative explanation, the thing that makes philosophical questions confusing is not that different people have different intuitions but that each individual person has conflicting intuitions. Thus, within a single individual, there can be an intuition pointing toward one answer and also an intuition pointing toward the exact opposite answer.
More free time to stroll around the city, catch up with colleagues, and discuss ongoing projects.
The workshop will conclude at the Carmen de la Victoria with a closing reception. We look forward to marking the end of two days of talks and discussion together.
Registration
Attendance is free, but please let us know if you are coming so we can plan accordingly. Just send a short email to Daniel Martín with your name and affiliation details.
Practical Information
Here you can find a document with all the information about the workshop, including the full program, how to get to the venue, and some recommendations for things to see, eat, and do during your stay in Granada.
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Organizers
Sponsors
The workshop is generously funded by a 2025 Leonardo Grant for Scientific Research and Cultural Creation (Philosophical Intuition and Non-Classical Conceptual Structure), awarded by the BBVA Foundation.